University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Survey Research And Methodology Program:
Faculty Publications

Survey Research And Methodology Program

2-2011

The Potential Value of Dynamic Tension in
Restructuring Negotiations
Michelle M. Hamer

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/sramfacpub
Hamer, Michelle M., "The Potential Value of Dynamic Tension in Restructuring Negotiations" (2011). Survey Research And
Methodology Program: Faculty Publications. 2.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/sramfacpub/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Survey Research And Methodology Program at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Survey Research And Methodology Program: Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

BANKRUPTCY

The Essential Resource for Today's Busy Insolvency Professional

The Potential Value of Dynamic Tension
in Restructuring Negotiations
Written by:
Michelle M. Harner
University of Maryland School of Law; Baltimore
mharner@law.umaryland.edu

Jamie Marincic
University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Lincoln, Neb.
jamiemarincic@gmail.com
Editor's Note: The empirical study
described in this article was funded by a
grant from the ABI Endowment Fund.

About the Authors
Michelle Hamer is an associate professor
of law at the University of Maryland School
of Law in Baltimore. Jamie Marincic is a
doctoral candidate in Survey Research
and Methodology at the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln in Lincoln, Neb.

The mandatory appointment of a creditors' committee was intended to provide
dynamic tension with the debtor that
would stimulate the reorganization process through effective and efficient oversight and negotiation.
-Harvey R. Millerl

D

ynamic tension is often used to
connote two or more conflicting
priorities that may influence decision-making. In the business-restructuring context, it has been used to describe
the relationship among debtors and their
various stakeholders, including secured
creditors, unsecured creditors and shareholders. 2 Each party potentially has a
unique and competing agenda regarding
the debtor's restructuring plan. Although
competing agendas can lead to conflict,
this can also encourage parties to reevaluate alternatives and explore different or
innovative ways to create value.
This potentially productive role
of dynamic tension in restructuring
1 "The Changing Face of Chapter 11 : A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy
Judge as Producer, Director and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization
Passion Play," 69 Am, Bankr, L. J. 431 , 449 (1995).
2 See, e.g., Thomas C. Given and Linda J. Philipps, "Equality in the Eye
of the Beholder-Classification of Claims and Interests in Chapter
11 Reorganizations," 43 Ohio St. L. J. 735, 735-36 (1982) (explaining "dynamic tension " in context of reorganization vs. liquidation
restructuring options); Donald R. Korobkin, "Bankruptcy Law, Ritual
and Performance," 103 Colum. L. Rev. 2124, 2130 (2003) (explaining
that resutts under bankruptcy laws often "spontaneously emerge ... at a
juncture of futility and loss, from the dynamic and generative tension
of normative directives in unavoidable conftict"); see also Miller, supra,
n.1, at 449; James E. Spiotto, "Overview of the Workout Process," The
Problems of Indenture Trustees and Bondholders, 731, 739 (PLI Real
Estate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. N4--4591 , 1995) ("Any
discussion of marshalling of assets would be incomplete without discussing the dynamic tension between unsecured and secured creditors.").
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negotiations arguably underlies the
committee structure
incorporated into
the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code . 3 In fact, the
legislative history
of § 1102 of the
Code suggests that
Congress anticipated a multiple-

represented by the committee. 5 In many
respects, the committee provides several
of the key monitoring functions previously performed by independent trustees and
the Securities and Exchange Commission
under chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.
"[A] creditors' committee 'is not a perfunctory or useless body, simply appointed to satisfy a formality established by
the Bankruptcy Code, but rather should
be a vital and integral part of the plan formulation process. '''6
Despite the importance of the committee structure, relatively little empirical work regarding the role and objectives served by the structure exists .
Accordingly, this empirical study was
designed to fill this void and shed light
on the workings of committees in chapter
11 cases. We are grateful for the funding

Cover Feature
committee structure in many cases. 4
Nevertheless, this structure has not
emerged as a dominant or even preferred option, given, among other
things, concerns regarding costs, efficiency and stakeholder interest in serving on committees .
The committee structure, whether
composed of one or multiple committees, is a core principle of chapter 11. The
committee oversees the debtor's conduct
during the case, investigates the debtor's
conduct prior to the case and advocates
the interests of the stakeholder group
3 See Miller, supra, n.1, at 449-50.
4 The legislative history provides, in relevant part:
There will be at least one committee in each case. Because
unsecured creditors are normally the largest body of creditors and most in need of representation, the bill requires that
there be a committee of unsecured creditors ... the bill also
provides for additional committees, with status equal to that
of the unsecured creditors' committee, when such additional
committees are needed to represent various other interests in
this case, including secured creditors, subordinated creditors,
and equity security holders.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 235-36 (1977) (footnote omitted).

to conduct this study provided by a grant
from the ABI Endowment Fund. We also
recei ved significant support and assistance
from The Bureau of Sociological Research
at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
The study'S primary data and analyses are presented in a forthcoming article
for the Vanderbilt Law Review (herein
referred to as "Committee Capture"),7 in
which we detail our methodology and the
components of our database, explain the
limitations of the study and then provide
5 See, e.g., InreABCAuto. Prods. Corp., 210 B.R. 437, 441 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1997) ("The function of the committee is to represent and protect
the interests of the unsecured creditors in the plan negotiation process
and throughout the entire bankruptcy case."); In re Diversified Capital
Corp. , 89 B.R. 826, 829 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) ("The purpose of a
committee of unsecured creditors is to monitor the operations and
activities of the debtor and its compliance with the requirements of the
Bankruptcy Code.").
6 Miller, supra, n.1, at 449-50 (c~ing Retail Mktg. Co v. Nw. Nat'l Bank (In
reMakolnc.), 120 B.R. 203, 212 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1990)).
7 Michelle M. Harner and Jamie Marincic, "Committee Capture? An
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors' Committees in Business
Reorganizations," 64 Vand. L. Rev., http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractjd= 1679986.
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a thorough analysis of the data. 8 This
article summarizes certain of the key
data analyses and interesting descriptive data included in the study, and the
"Committee Capture" article should be
consulted for a complete understanding
of the study and its implications.

Overview of the Study
We created the study's case database by systematically coding the court
dockets of 296 chapter 11 cases. The
database contains information on 129
primary variables (e.g., filing date, number of committee members, whether
plan was filed, whether sale was pursued, ultimate case resolution). The
cases, filed between Jan. 1,2002, and
Dec. 31 , 2008, were selected from six
jurisdictions using a stratified random
sample. 9 All but 12 ofthe sampled cases
had some definitive indication of case
outcome at the end of the data-collection period. 10
Recognizing that the case database
reflected only public information disclosed by parties in documents filed on
the docket, we supplemented the case
component of the study with a survey of
300 professionals who work on chapter
11 cases and 300 individuals who have
served on creditors' committees in those
cases. The survey collected information
about committee activities in chapter 11
cases-relations among committees, the
debtor and other parties in the caseand the influence of and conflicts among
committee members and professionals.
Acceptable response rates were received
on both surveys.ll Some of the survey
data has been summarized in this article,
but a more complete report is forthcoming in a symposium issue of the Seattle
Law Review. 12
The overwhelming majority of cases
in the database involved business debtors organized as corporations . Based
on the debtors' schedules of assets
and liabilities, the median amount of
See id. (manuscript at 17-20, 34-35).
We used the District of Delaware, Northern District of Illinois and
Southern District of New York as primary jurisdictions, and the Central
District of California, District of Maryland and Northern District of Ohio
as add~ional jurisdictions. The use of and justifications for selecting
these jurisdictions are explained fully in "Committee Capture." See
Harner and Marincic, supra, n.7 (manuscript at 17-20).
10 For most cases in the database, we collected data from the petition
date through and including the ea~ier of the closing of the case and
June 30, 2009. For cases unresolved as of June 30, 2009, we performed additional data collection through and including June 30, 2010.
See Hamer and Marincic, supra, n.7 (manuscript at 17-20).
11 There were 251 professionals and 213 committee members that
were contacted and met eligibility criteria. Ultimately, 70 professionals (28 percent) and 43 committee members (20 percent) completed the survey.
12 The survey data and analyses are being presented at the Annual Ado"
A. Berle, Jr. Center of Corporations, Law and Society Symposium
and was published in the corresponding symposium issue of the
Seattle Law Review, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.
cfm?abstractjd=1736024.

assets was $2,508,000 and the median
amount of liabilities was $6,156,700Y
Approximately 66 percent of the cases
involved between 1-199 creditors, with
the remaining cases involving 200 or
more creditors. 14 As explained more fully
in "Committee Capture," "143 cases
(48.3 percent) involved at least one creditors' committee and 153 cases (51.7 percent) involved no creditors' committees.
Of the cases with creditors' committees,
95.8 percent had one creditors' committee, 2.1 percent had two creditors' committees and 2.1 percent had three creditors' committees.,,15

Analysis of the Case Database
Based on anecdotal evidence and the
legislative history of § 1102, we formulated two hypotheses to test in the study.
In the first hypothesis, "creditors' com13 See Harner and Marincic, supra, n.7 (rnanuscript at 21).
14 See id. (rnanuscript at 22).
15 Id. (rnanuscript at 23) (footnote ornitted) (as of Dec. 7, 2010). "Overall,
152 cases (51.4 percent) involved some type of committee (i.e.,
creditors' committee, equity committee, ad hoc committee or some
combination), leaving 144 cases (48.6 percent) with no committee
involvemen\." Id.; see also chart 1.

mittees add value to Chapter 11 cases,
as determined by returns to unsecured
creditors and company reorganizations.,,'6 In the second hypothesis, "the
presence or absence of conflict or selfinterest in the composition of creditors'
committees impacts value in Chapter 11
cases, as determined by returns to unsecured creditors and company reorganizations."'? We analyzed "returns to" creditors based on data regarding percentage
of recoveries to unsecured creditors and
"company reorganizations" based on
whether debtors reorganized under a plan
of reorganization or sold substantially all
of their assets under either a liquidating
plan or in a § 363 sale.
As noted, approximately half of the
cases in the database involved one or
more statutory or ad hoc committees.
The cases were further divided into
three categories, as shown in chart 1:
cases with no committees (NC cases),
cases with one creditors' committee
16 Id. (manuscript at 35).
17 Id.

Chart 1: Committee Structure (n=296)

• No Comm ittee (NC) (n=144)

• One Credi tors' Committee
(UCC) (n=115)
• Other Committee (OC)
(n=37)

Chart 2: Percentage of Cases (Confirmed Plans Only) with Resolution
by Committee Type (Controlling for Assets and DIP Financing)
100%
86%
80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
UCC (n=75)

- Reorgan ization

NC (n=82)

OC (n=32)

- liquidation (including sa le fllotion)
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(UCC cases) and cases with multiple
or other committees (OC cases).lS The
OC cases included cases with more
than one type of creditors' committee
or some combination of a creditors'
committee, an equityholders' committee or an ad hoc committee. These categories were then used in some of our
analyses to determine the impact of a
creditors' committee's activities in a
particular case. We also controlled for
other potentially confounding variables,
such as asset size, number of creditors,
liabilities, secured creditors and debtorin-possession (DIP) financing, to try to
isolate the impact of creditors' committees on chapter 11 cases. 19
As further explained in "Committee
Capture" and shown in charts 2 and 3,
"[c]ases with a single creditors' committee were significantly more likely
than the other two categories to result in
a plan of liquidation or a motion to sell
substantially all of the debtor's assets .. .
Those cases also were significantly more
likely to provide distributions to unse18 Id. (manuscript at 23). The DC Cases category captures data for
cases where no single committee was appointed to represent unsecured creditors.
19 See id. (manuscript at 28-29).

cured creditors in amounts less than or
equal to 50 percent of their claim values.,,20 These effects persisted even after
controlling for potentially confounding
factors. Thus, the data tend to support
rejecting the first hypothesis.
With respect to the second hypothesis, the data evidence showed actual
and potential conflicts of interest among
multiple committee members. Moreover,
committees frequently are involved in
litigated disputes with debtors or other
creditors. Nevertheless, neither conflicts
of interest nor litigation impacted value
in the database cases.21 The data show no
significant increase or decrease in returns
to unsecured creditors or the likelihood
of reorganization based on conflicts of
interest or litigation. The data tends to
support rejecting the second hypothesis.
Although conflicts of interest and
litigation do not appear to significantly
impact value, they do tend to increase
the costs associated with and duration of
chapter 11 cases. 22 The amount and types
of disputes resulting in litigation also
are striking. Committees tend not to file
20 Id. (manuscript at 6).
21 See id. (manuscript at 31-34).
22 See id. (manuscript at 33-34).

Chart 3: Percentage of Cases with Percentage Recovery to Unsecured Creditors
by Committee Type (Controlling for Assets and DIP Financing)
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70%
60%
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Chart 4: How Does Conflict Between the Debtor and the UCC Regarding
the Restructuring Plan Typically Impact Returns to Creditors?
100%

79%

80%

77%

60%
- Committee Members (n=19)
40%

- Professiona ls (n=48)

20%

0%

+---"-Decreases returns

No impact on retu rn s

Increases returns

formal objections to fundamental transactions in the case, such as DIP financing, motions to sell substantially all of
the debtor's assets and confirmation of
a plan of reorganization. However, they
do frequently file or become actively
involved in litigation with secured creditors and debtors. For example, committees filed an objection or other pleading
opposing conduct by secured creditors
or debtors in 24 percent and 67 percent, respectively, ofthe database cases
involving creditors' committees. 23
In addition, creditors' committees are
likely to retain at least one-and perhaps
multiple-professionals in chapter 11
cases. For example, committees in 135
of the 143 cases (94.4 percent) with at
least one creditors' committee retained
at least one lawyer or law firm. Likewise,
committees in 89 of the 143 cases (62.2
percent) with at least one creditors' committee retained financial advisers.24 Of
these cases, 98 (68.5 percent) involved
multiple lawyers and financial advisers.25
The retention of a financial adviser did
not significantly impact the returns to
unsecured creditors or the likelihood of
the debtor reorganizing. 26

Analysis of Survey Data
The professionals' and committee
members' surveys drew responses from
a variety of individuals with extensive
collective experience in chapter 11 cases.
The majority of respondents to the committee members' survey served on creditors' committees, with a small percentage serving on equityholders' and ad
hoc committees. Of these individuals,
15 have served on more than 10 creditors' committees and six have served on
more than 10 ad hoc committees. The
respondents to the professionals' survey
were primarily divided among individuals representing debtors (35.7 percent),
committees (17 .2 percent) and some
combination of parties (31.4 percent)
involved in chapter 11 cases.27 Of those
individuals, approximately two-thirds
(61.5 percent) reported working on more
than 10 cases in any given year.
The survey questions focused
largely on how committees interact
with other parties in chapter 11 cases
23 See id. (manuscript at 32).
24 Accordingly, 54 of these cases (37.8 percent) did not involve the retention of financiaf advisers.
25 Specifically, of the 143 cases, eight have neither a financial adviser nor
a lawyer, 37 have one lawyernaw firm and the remaining 98 have some
combination of lawyers and/or financial advisers.
26 The overwhelming majority of respondents (94.9 percent) were lawyers.
Given the high percentage of cases appointing at least one law firm or
lawyer for the committee, we did not have sufficient variability to analyze the impact of lawyers on value.
27 In addition, 2.9 percent represent DIP lenders and 4.3 percent represent
individual creditors in chapter 11 cases.
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and consequently did not specifically
address which was a more preferable
structure: no committee, one creditors'
committee or multiple committees.
Nevertheless, both groups of respondents suggest that disputes among the
creditors' committee and the debtor
or among the ad hoc committee and
the debtor regarding the debtor's
plan of reorganization generate additional value for unsecured creditors,
as shown in chart 4. 28 Likewise, both
groups suggest that the involvement
of one or more creditors trying to
exert control over the chapter 11 case
increases returns to unsecured creditors.29 Although the case study did
not observe any significant association between conflicts or disputes and
returns to creditors, the survey data
lends support to the overarching notion
that greater creditor participation in
the chapter 11 case-i.e., dynamic tension-may enhance value. 30
Moreover, both groups reported
instances of conflict among committee
members . The most frequently cited
conflict involved disagreement over the
debtor's plan of reorganization with at
least one member being motivated by
self interest. 31 The survey data suggested that most of these conflicts are
resolved informally, without the need
for any formal pleading with or resolution by the court. 32 In fact, the data
showed that many committee objections
to fundamental transactions are voiced
in an informal manner and a majority
of all committee objections are resolved
without court intervention (see charts 5
and 6 for other responses available to
respondents) .33 This data may explain
28 About 77 percent of professionals and 78 percent of committee members indicated that conflict between the debtor and the creditors'
committee regarding the restructuring plan typically results in increased
returns to creditors. Nea~y 40 percent of professionals and 63 percent
of committee members indicated that such conflict between the debtor
and ad hoc committee typically results in increased returns to creditors.
Respondents also could select that the conflict decreased or had no
impact on retums to creditors.
29 About 33 percent of professionals and 45 percent of committee members indicated that the activities of individual creditors or small groups
of creditors trying to assert influence in chapter 11 cases typically result
in increased retums to creditors. Respondents also could select that
such influence decreased or had no impact on returns to creditors.
30 In addition to the limitations inherent in this type of survey study (e.g.,
self-selection bias), the difference between the survey study and case
study data regarding conflicts of interest or disputes and value impact
may relate to the off-docket nature of many conflicts of interest and
disputes among parties in a chapter 11 case. See Harner and Marincic,
supra, n.7 (manuscript at 31). The survey data confirms that many conflicts of interest and disputes are resolved without the filing of a formal
pleading with or intervention by the bankruptcy court.
31 Approximately 57 percent of professionals and 45 percent of committee
members selected this option among six other options, including disagreement over restructuring plan with no members motivated by selfinterest, disagreement over a significant event in the chapter 11 case
with at least one member motivated by self-interest, disagreement over
a significant event in the chapter 11 case with no members motivated
by self-interest, disagreement over selection of professionals, other and
not applicable.
32 In the survey, 90 percent of professionals and 88 percent of committee
members indicated that disputes among committee members are most
commonly resolved in this way.

the lack of formal committee objections
to fundamental transactions recorded in
the case database.34

Preliminary Observations
The rejection of the two primary
hypotheses underlying the study raises
interesting policy and doctrinal questions. We do not believe that the data
suggest that creditors' committees are
ineffective, but instead observes interesting trends that suggest potential enhancements to the use and composition of
creditors' comrnittees. 35
For example, OC and NC cases performed significantly better than VCC
cases with respect to returns to creditors and the likelihood of debtor reorganization. An immediate and obvious
response is to attribute the difference
to factors such as the larger amount of
33 Almost 32 percent of professionals and 23 percent of committee
members indicated that objections raised by the creditors' committees
are most commonly informal, with 95 percent of professionals and 76
percent of committee members indicated that the majority of creditors' committees' objections are resolved without court intervention. Of
these, nearly 28 percent of professionals and 41 percent of committee
members indicated that objections raised by the ad hoc committee are
most commonly informal. Approximately 71 percent of professionals
and 81 percent of committee members indicated that the majority of ad
hoc committees' objections are resolved without court intervention.
34 The key analyses underlying the case database component of the
study do not rely on committee objections to fundamental transactions.
Nevertheless, this off-docket information is an example of a limitation of
observational studies.
35 See Hamer and Marincic, supra, n.7 (manuscript at 35-41).

assets and greater number of creditors
typically involved in OC cases .36 That
response turns out to be incorrect, given
that the significance remained even after
we controlled for those and other potentially confounding factors. This suggests
that something else is going on.
One potential explanation is dynamic
tension. In OC cases, more creditors are
taking a more active role in the chapter
11 process. Accordingly, rather than having just one priority voiced to the debtor
through a single creditors' committee,
multiple parties voice potentially competing priorities, which may cause all
parties to evaluate valuations, restructuring options and the like more closely.3?
It also may suggest an underutilization
of, or passivity by, creditors' committees when no other major constituency is
organized or active in the case.
We explore these and other potential
explanations in "Committee Capture,"
and we hope to continue this evaluation in our analysis of the survey data
and future studies . Our ultimate goal is
to help judges, practitioners and policymakers better understand the role of
committees in chapter 11 and how they
36 See id. app. B (manuscript at 44).
37 See id. (manuscript at 35-41).

Chart 5: Based on Past Experiences, Are the Most Common Objections
Raised by the UCC Chapter 11 Cases Formal or Informal Objections?
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Chart 6: Based on Past Experiences, Which of the Following Best Describes
How the Majority of Objections Raised by the UCC Are Resolved?
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might utilize the committee structure
more effectively and efficiently going
forward . As often suggested by courts
and commentators, "the very nature of
a chapter 11 case (the attempt to continue the debtor's business, generally
the continuation of a DIP and the need
to address both the determination of
assets available for secured and unsecured creditors and equity security
holders and the determination of the
allocation of said assets among creditors and equity security holders) dictates
a much more active role for committees
in chapter 11 cases."38 •

Reprinted with permission from the ABI
Journal, Vol. xxx, No.1, February 2011.
The American Bankruptcy Institute is a
multi-disciplinary, nonpartisan organization
devoted to bankruptcy issues. ABI has
more than 12,500 members, representing
all facets of the insolvency field. For more
information, visit ABI World at www.
abiworld.org.

38 In re Malin Motor Oillnc., 689 F.2d 445, 455 (3d Cir. 1982) (citatioo omitted).
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